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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
v 
BRYAN JAY STEPHENS, 
Defendant/Appellant 
Case No. 960452-CA 
Priority No. 2 
JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
Jurisdiction is conferred on this Court pursuant to Utah 
Code A- -,-ou/\e) (1996). 
STATUTES. RULES, AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS 
T--.- o^urt.h amendment to the federal constitution 
provides: 
[Unreasonable searches and seizures.] 
The right of the people to be secure in their 
persons, houses, papers, and effects, against 
unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be 
violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable 
cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly 
describing the place to be searched, and the persons or 
things to be seized. •. 
Article "1 section 14 of the Utah Constitution provides:1 
Sec. 14. Unreasonable searches forbidden -- Issuance 
of warrant.] 
The right of the people to be secure in their 
persons, houses, papers and effects against unreasonable 
searches and seizures shall not be violated; and no 
warrant shall issue but upon probable cause supported by 
oath or affirmation, particularly describing the place to 
be searched, and the person or thing to be seized. 
xMr. Stephens advances no separate state constitutional claim, 
but article I, § 14 nevertheless grants him protection at least 
equal to that of the fourth amendment. 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES, STANDARDS OF REVIEW. 
AND PRESERVATION BELOW 
1. Whether the trial court erred in denying appellant's 
motion to suppress? 
Standard of review . 
In reviewing a trial court's decision to grant 
or deny a motion to suppress, findings of fact will not 
be disturbed unless they are clearly erroneous. State v. 
Steward, 806 P.2d 213, 215 (Utah App. 1991); Utah R. 
Civ. P. 52(a) (1990) . However, in reviewing the court's 
conclusions of law, we apply a correction of error 
standard. Steward, 806 P.2d at 215. 
State v. Godina-Luna, 826 P.2d 652, 654 (Utah App. 1992) . 
Preserved below at R. 25-31 (motion and memo to 
suppress), 162-96 (suppression hearing transcript), especially at 
193-4. 
2. Whether the prosecutor committed misconduct in 
commenting on the drug problem in society at large? 
Standard of Review. In assessing the prosecutor's 
questions and argument, this court will make an original 
determination of whether the prosecutor brought improper 
information to the jury's attention, and whether such information 
probably influenced the jurors. State v. Trov, 688 P.2d 483, 486 
(Utah 1984) . If this court views the evidence of guilt to be 
ambiguous or in conflict with other evidence, this court will "more 
closely scrutinize the conduct." Id. 
Preserved below at R. 352. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE AND NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS 
Bryan Jay Stephens was charged by information with 
possession of methamphetamine, marijuana, and drug paraphernalia. 
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R. 5-6. He filed a motion to suppress, R. 25-31 (motion and memo), 
33-40 (State's response), which was heard, R. 162-196, and denied, 
R. 41-6 (findings and conclusions) . Mr. Stephens was convicted at 
jury trial, and sentenced to the Utah State Prison, stayed pending 
satisfactory completion of probation. R. 93-5 (verdicts), 136-9 
(judgement, sentence (commitment)). This appeal ensued. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On February 20, 1994, Deputy Broadhead stopped Mr. 
Stephen's vehicle for failure to signal. His report reads: 
As I activated my overhead lights the driver and sole occupant 
of the vehicle made several rapid movements towards his right. 
The car did not initially stop, but continued eastbound on 
4500 South. Eventually the vehicle stopped and as I exited my 
patrol car and was approaching the suspect vehicle on foot I 
again saw the suspect made another rapid stuffing movement 
towards the right front passenger seat area. 
As I approached the vehicle I made contact with a male White 
driver who was the sole occupant of the vehicle, later 
identified as suspect Bryan Stephens. I asked the suspect why 
he was making all of the stuffing movements towards the right 
front area of the car prior to my stopping him. The suspect 
responded, "I didn't know that I was." 
I then asked the suspect if he had concealed any weapons or 
any kind of contraband under the seat. The suspect replied, 
"No, you're free to look if you want." During my conversation 
with the suspect I noticed that he had a large amount of sweat 
on his forehead and on his face, and that he appeared 
extremely nervous. 
I explained to the suspect that because of his stuffing 
movements, as well as his nervous demeanor, that I feared that 
he had placed some sort of weapon or contraband underneath the 
front seat and that I would like to check under that area. 
Again the suspect said, "Go right ahead." 
I then had the suspect exit the vehicle at which time I looked 
under the right front seat. At that time I was able to see a 
brown leather case which was partially protruding from 
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underneath the right front seat. There were no other items 
under that area of the seat. 
Because that was the only item under the seat, coupled with 
the fact I had seen the suspect make the stuffing motions to 
that area, I opened the purse (?) and saw that it contained 
[drugs and drug paraphernalia] . 
Deputy Broadhead's report at 2-3, R. 39-40.2 
Mr. Stephens moved to suppress the evidence on various 
grounds including, inter alia, that the officer exceeded the scope 
of any consent by opening the leather purse in which the drugs and 
paraphernalia were found. R. 175, 193-4, renewed at trial at R. 
294-5.3 
Mr. Stephens was convicted at trial. During the 
prosecutor's closing argument, the prosecutor drew the jurors' 
attention to the drug problem at large: 
[By the prosecutor] You may say, "Well, yeah we have got 
Mr. Stephens charged with a crime. There is no victim 
here with regard to those offenses. We have only taken 
roughly two hours to present the case to you today, why 
all of the big fuss and bother to occupy your time for a 
day? Well, you all know the impact that this type of 
offense has. 
MR. YOUNGBERG: Objection, judge. 
THE COURT: Sustained and Mr. Christensen I am going 
to ask that you refrain from making that argument and, 
members of the jury, let me just simply admonish you that 
your verdict in this case, of course, must be based 
solely and totally upon the evidence that is introduced 
during this particular case and, of course, you must not 
be swayed by public opinion or feeling. 
R. 352. 
2These pages are attachments to the State's memorandum in 
opposition and were relied on by both parties as the factual basis 
for the suppression motion. A copy is attached as addendum A. 
3The leather purse or pouch was admitted at trial as State's 
Exhibit 1. R. 224 (brown pouch identified by Deputy Broadhead), R. 
2 93 (received into evidence). 
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SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
The consent Deputy Broadhead obtained to "look" or 
"check" under the seat of Mr. Stephens7 vehicle cannot reasonably 
be construed to extend to closed containers. Deputy Broadhead's 
actions exceeded the scope of the consent. Mr. Stephens' 
suppression motion should have been granted. 
The prosecutor committed prejudicial misconduct by 
commenting on the drug problem in society at large. The trial 
court's admonition could not dispel the prejudice. The State had 
scant evidence linking Mr. Stephens to the leather purse containing 
the contraband. It is entirely possible that the jury convicted 
Mr. Stephens based on concerns about the drug problem, especially 
among homeless persons, rather than a knowing or intentional 
possession of contraband. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DENYING 
APPELLANT'S MOTION TO SUPPRESS. 
To be proper under the fourth amendment, the State has 
the burden of showing that an exception to the warrant requirement 
is applicable to a warrantless search. Katz v. United States, 389 
U.S. 347, 357, 88 S.Ct. 507, 514, 19 L.Ed.2d 576 (1967). 
The State argued only consent, and the trial court 
sustained the search here based on Mr. Stephens' consent. See 
Findings, R. 41-6, attached as Addendum B. However, the trial 
court failed to address the scope of that consent. 
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"Even when a constitutionally valid consent is given, the 
scope of the ensuing search must be limited to the scope of the 
consent, and police activity that exceeds the scope of the consent 
violates the Fourth Amendment. " State v. Dunn, 850 P. 2d 1201, 1218 
(Utah 1993) ; accord Walter v. United States, 447 U.S. 649, 656, 100 
S.Ct. 2395, 2401, 65 L.Ed.2d 410 (1980). "The standard for 
measuring the scope of a suspect's consent under the Fourth 
Amendment is that of 'objective' reasonableness--what would the 
typical reasonable person have understood by the exchange between 
the officer and the suspect?" State v. Castner, 825 P.2d 699, 705 
(Utah App. 1992) (citing Florida v. Jimeno, 500 U.S. 248, 251, 111 
S.Ct. 1801, 1803-04, 114 L.Ed.2d 297 (1991)); accord State v. 
Genovesi, 871 P.2d 547, 552 n.6 (Utah App. 1994). 
The consent given here cannot be reasonably construed to 
extend to sealed containers. Deputy Broadhead's report provides: 
I then asked the suspect if he had concealed any weapons or 
any kind of contraband under the seat. The suspect replied, 
"No, you're free to look if you want." During my conversation 
with the suspect I noticed that he had a large amount of sweat 
on his forehead and on his face, and that he appeared 
extremely nervous. 
I explained to the suspect that because of his stuffing 
movements, as well as his nervous demeanor, that I feared that 
he had placed some sort of weapon or contraband underneath the 
front seat and that I would like to check under that area. 
Again the suspect said, "Go right ahead." 
Mr. Stephens only offered to allow Deputy Broadhead to "look" under 
the passenger seat. Deputy Broadhead only requested to "check" 
under the right front seat. Mr. Stephens consented to this limited 
intrusion. That search revealed the zippered leather purse or 
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pouch, A zippered leather purse or pouch is neither a weapon nor 
contraband. 
Deputy Broadhead exceeded the scope of Mr. Stephens' 
consent by opening the zippered leather purse or pouch. Deputy 
Broadhead never used the word "search" in his request. See also R. 
220-221 (at trial, Deputy Broadhead testifies again using only the 
words "check" and "look"). Deputy Broadhead looked under the seat, 
and saw only the zipped leather purse or pouch. The leather purse 
or pouch was neither a weapon nor contraband. By proceeding 
further, without probable cause or consent, Deputy Broadhead 
violated Mr. Stephens' fourth amendment and article I, section 14 
rights. 
People v. Thiret, 685 P.2d 193 (Colo. 1984)4 is 
instructive. There, officers asked defendant "if he minded if they 
'looked around the house,'" and he consented to this intrusion. 
685 P. 2d at 197. The court found that the search performed 
exceeded the scope of the consent given: 
What the defendant agreed to was to permit the officers 
to "look around" the house. A "look around" connotes a 
casual observation of the premises. The "look around," 
however, consisted of a search of the defendant's three 
bedroom house by four officers over a period of forty-
five minutes, including an inspection of piles of clothes 
and debris, and an examination of drawers, boxes, and 
other closed containers. This extensive type of search 
was far in excess of the "look around" authorized by the 
defendant, see, e.g., United States v. Dichiarinte. 445 
F.2d 126 (7th Cir. 1971); [People v. iTorrand. 622 P.2d 
562 [Colo. 1981]; People v. Sanders. 44 111. App.3d 510, 
3 111.Dec. 208, 385 N.E.2d 375 (1976); State v. Cuzick, 
21 Wash.App. 501, 585 P.2d 485 (1978), and the seizure of 
4Thiret was cited with approval by this Court in State v. 
Marshall, 791 P.2d 880, 888 (Utah App. 1990). 
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the photograph and the film in the course of the search 
was invalid. 
Thiret, 685 P.2d at 201. 
In State v. Genovesi, 909 P.2d 916, 920 (Utah App. 1995), 
this Court invalidated (but held harmless) the removal of part of 
a wall and a piece of carpet under a generalized consent to search 
a house. Here, Deputy Broadhead's search of the closed leather 
container under Mr. Stephens' seat exceeded the scope of the 
consent to "look" or "check" under the seat. 
Under all the facts and circumstances, the search here 
was improper under the fourth amendment and article I, section 14. 
The motion to suppress should have been granted. 
POINT II. THE PROSECUTOR COMMITTED MISCONDUCT BY 
COMMENTING ON THE DRUG PROBLEM IN SOCIETY AT 
LARGE. 
In his closing argument, the prosecutor commented on the 
drug problem in society at large, indicating that this case was 
important because of that societal problem and implying that the 
jury should convict in part to help remedy that problem. This 
argument was improper on two grounds. 
In State v. Dunn, 850 P.2d 1201, 1224 (Utah 1991) the 
court found it improper for the prosecutor to argue that jurors 
should consider their obligations to society in their 
deliberations. The statement here, "Well, you all know the impact 
that this type of offense has," invites the jurors to do precisely 
the same. Accord State v. Andreason, 718 P.2d 400, 402 (Utah 1986) 
("Statements which suggest that a jury has an obligation to convict 
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a defendant on some basis other than solely on the evidence before 
it are improper and beyond the broad latitude allowed in closing 
argument."); State v. Smith, 700 P.2d 1106, 1112 (Utah 1985) 
(condemning statements which "suggested that the jury had some 
obligation beyond the determination of the guilt or innocence of 
the defendant solely on the basis of the evidence introduced at 
trial"). 
The statement here also runs afoul of the prohibition 
against unsupported innuendo. In State v. Emmett, 839 P. 2d 781 
(Utah 1992) the court held that it was improper to ask questions 
which implied facts which were not proven. "Otherwise, the only 
limit on such a line of questioning would be the prosecutor's 
imagination. " Emmett, 839 P. 2d at 787. Accord State v. Palmer, 
860 P.2d 339, 343 (Utah App.), cert, denied. 868 P.2d 1995 (Utah 
1993) . Here, no evidence was presented concerning the drug problem 
in society at large, nor would any such evidence have been relevant 
or admissible. The elements of the offenses charged do not 
implicate or require proof of any societal drug problems. By 
commenting on such matters, the prosecutor was in effect becoming 
a fact witness in the trial, a role he has no business playing. 
Accord State v. Palmer, 860 P.2d 339, 343 (Utah App.), cert, 
denied, 868 P.2d 1995 (Utah 1993). 
Drawing the jurors' attention to societal drug problems 
creates a serious risk that the jurors may convict because of their 
concern about those societal problems, rather than basing their 
verdict solely on consideration of whether the prosecution has 
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established the elements of the charged offenses. In a close case, 
such as this, such misconduct can shift the tide and result in a 
conviction where an acquittal might otherwise have been rendered. 
The prosecution had scant evidence linking Mr. Stephens 
to the leather purse or pouch which contained the drugs and 
paraphernalia. Deputy Broadhead testified concerning the alleged 
stuffing motions he observed. R. 214, 216-7. Mr. Stephens 
testified that it was not his. R. 321. Officer Broadhead7 s report 
originally stated, "He stated that the case was not his and that he 
did not know how it got into his car," Report at 3 (R. 40), R. at 
263-4, but Broadhead later filed a supplemental report claiming 
that Mr. Stephens had said the case was his, but he did not know 
how the contents came to be inside. R. 264-5. Defense witness 
Elena Garcia testified that she was with Mr. Stephens the date of 
the alleged offense, and that he had transported a possibly 
homeless women "Debbie" and all of her belongings to an apartment 
building on Redwood Road. R. 297-301, 307. She testified that the 
leather purse or pouch "looks like something she had." R. 301-2. 
Debbie sat in the back seat behind the passenger seat while being 
transported. R. 302. Ms. Garcia had never seen Mr. Stephens in 
possession of the purse. R. 303. Mr. Stephens also testified 
concerning transporting Debbie. R. 317-8. Mr. Stephens testified 
that the movements Deputy Broadhead observed may have been Stephens 
attempting to buckle his seatbelt. R. 321. 
This case turned on whether the jury believed Deputy 
Broadhead and his supplemental report over Mr. Stephens, Ms. 
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Garcia, and Broadhead's original report. The prosecution's 
reference to the drug problem in society, in light of this 
evidentiary picture, was highly prejudicial. There was substantial 
evidence that the purse and its contents may have belonged to 
Debbie, a possibly homeless person. It is entirely possible that 
the jury convicted Mr. Stephens based on concerns about the drug 
problem, especially among homeless persons. 
While the trial court sustained the objection and gave a 
cautionary instruction, the harm had already been done. The bell 
once rung cannot be unrung. Mr. Stephens should be granted a new 
trial. 
CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing, Mr. Stephens respectfully 
requests that his conviction be vacated, his suppression motion be 
granted, and that the case be remanded for further proceedings. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this ?/ day of March, 1997. 
ROBERT K: HEINEMAN 
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant 
ROBIN K. LJUNGBERG 
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant 
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CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY 
I, Robert K. Heineman, hereby certify that I have caused 
eight copies of the foregoing to be delivered to the Utah Court of 
Appeals, 400 Midtown Plaza, 230 South 500 East, Salt Lake City, 
Utah 84102, and four copies to Kris Leonard, the Attorney General's 
Office, Heber M. Wells Building, 160 East 300 South 6th Floor, P.O. 
Box 140854, Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-0854, this %l day of 
March, 1997. 
Robert K. Heineman 
DELIVERED/MAILED this day of March, 1997. 
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ADDENDUM A 
Pages 2 and 3 of Deputy Broadhead's Report (R. 39-40) 
'OFFiNtccooE: SALT UXE COUNTY SHERIFFS OPPlwE 
NARRATIVE CONTINUATION SHEET ^ wui^p'" 94-22083 
booked into Evidence at 0100 hours. 
PREMISES: 
A public street. 
NARRATIVE SECTION: 
At the indicated time this date while on routine patrol I was driving 
my marked patrol car southbound on 300 West and approximately 40th 
South. I was following a silver colored Ford Fairmont which was 
in front of me, also southbound 300 West approaching 4500 South. 
Upon arriving at the light at 4500 South and 3rd West the suspect 
vehicle as well as myself stopped for the red light. As the traffic 
signal turned green for southbound traffic the suspect vehicle made 
a left hand turn onto 4500 South, proceeding eastbound. The suspect 
vehicle made this turn without signaling. 
I then effected a traffic stop of the vehicle at 80 East and 4500 
South in order to contact the driver regarding the traffic violation. 
As I activated my overhead lights the driver and sole occupant of 
the vehicle made several rapid movements towards his right. 
The car did not initially stop, but continued eastbound on 4500 South. 
Eventually the vehicle stopped and as I exited my patrol car and was 
approaching the suspect vehicle on foot I again saw the suspect made 
another rapid stuffing movement towards the right front passenger seat 
area. 
As I approached the vehicle I made contact with a male White driver 
who was the sole occupant of the vehicle, later identified as suspect 
Bryan Stephens. I asked the suspect why he was making all of the 
stuffing movements towards the right front area of the car prior to 
my stopping him. The suspect responded, "I didn't know that I was." 
I then asked the suspect if he had concealed any weapons or any kind 
of contraband under the seat. The suspect replied, wNo, you're free 
to look if you want." During my conversation with the suspect I 
noticed that he had a large amount of sweat on his forehead and on 
his face, and that he appeared extremely nervous. 
I explained to the suspect that because of his stuffing movements, 
as well as his nervous demeanor, that I feared that he had placed 
some sort of weapon or contraband underneath the front seat and 
that I would like to check under that area. Again the suspect said, 
tWUtft* R°l 
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"Go r ight ahead." 
I then had the suspect exit the vehicle at which time I looked under 
the right front seat. At that time I was able to see a brown leather 
case which was partially protruding from underneath the right front 
seat. There were no other items under that area of the seat. 
Because that was the only item under the seat, coupled with the fact 
that I had seen the suspect make the stuffing motions to that area, 
I opened the purse (?) and saw that it contained the following items: 
two Ziploc baggies containing suspected marijuana, one glass vial 
containing suspected marijuana, a large paper bindle containing 
suspected methamphetamine, a mirror with white powder residue, a 
marijuana smoking pipe, three snorting straws, several unused paper 
bindles. 
I then approached the suspect with the brown leather case and its 
contents and asked him what he knew about the contents of the case. 
He stated that the case was not his and that he did not know how 
it got into his car. I then advised the suspect of his Miranda 
rights to which he stated that he understood and that he was 
desirous of contacting an attorney prior to speaking with me about 
the case; therefore, I did not ask the suspect any other questions 
concerning this matter. 
Because the suspect admitted that the case was used by him as well as 
him being the sole occupant of the car, coupled with the stuffing 
movements that I saw him make to the right front seat area as well as 
there being no other items under the seat, I formed the opinion that 
the suspect knew about those items and had concealed them at that 
location. 
I arrested him for possession of methamphetamine, possession of mari-
juana and possession of narcotic paraphernalia. I subsequently 
transported and booked him into Salt Lake County Jail for those 
charges. 
Deputy Snyder, who was with me during this entire incident and who 
witnessed the consent from the suspect to check his vehicle, also 
impounded the suspect's car as hold for owner. 
The facts of this case will be presented to the Salt Lake County 
Attorney's Office for consideration of a criminal filing. There is 
nothing further at this time. This report concluded. 
* > * 
frV \i 
®\ 
Deputy Name: BROADHEAD GH tBftf E R2PW-/?4 YY 3 +T> 
80-00741/00 
o n o A 4 ft 
ADDENDUM B 
Trial court findings and conclusions (R. 41-6) 
Third judicial District 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT 07 THE THIRD JUDICIAL DI^j^CjTg jggg 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OP W U J I T U , i & i ; t t 1 Y 
,ju*y Clerk 
THE STATE OF UTAH J 
Plaintiff : 
VS. ! 
BRYAN JAY STEPHENS J 
Defendant : 
CASE NO. 951901961F8 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
AND 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
JUDGE TYRONE E. MEDLEY 
The above-entitled matter came before this court pursuant to 
Defendant's MOTION TO SUPPRESS on the 2nd day of January 1996 
challenging the search and subsequent seizure of controlled 
substances and drug paraphernalia. The defendant although not 
present was represented by his attorney of record, Robin K. 
Youngberg, the State was represented by attorney of record, 
Michael J. christensen. 
The Court having heard the arguments of both the defendant 
and the State regarding the defendant's Motion to Suppress, now 
being fully advised makes the following FINDINGS OF FACT and 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW: 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. On February 20, 1995, Salt Lake County Deputy Sheriff Dave 
Broadhead witnessed the defendant Bryan Jay Stephens violate the 
traffic code by failing to properly signal while turning left 
(eastbound) at 300 West and 4500 South. 
2. Deputy Broadhead activated his overhead lights to effect a 
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traffic stop. The defendant did not immediately stop and made 
several rapid movements to the right prior to stopping. As 
Deputy Broadhead exited his vehicle and approached, the defendant 
made another rapid "stuffing" movement to the right. 
3. The defendant denied making any stuffing movements when asked 
about his actions prior and after stopping by Deputy Broadhead. 
In response to Deputy Broadhead's query if he had any concealed 
weapons or contraband under the seat, the defendant said; "No, 
you're free to look if you want." 
4. Because of the defendant's apparent extreme nervousness, 
Deputy Broadhead explained to the defendant his concern for his 
safety as well as the possibility that the defendant had placed a 
weapon or contraband under the front seat. Deputy Broadhead 
requested permission to check under the seat and the defendant 
responded "Go right ahead." 
5. The defendant exited the vehicle and Deputy Broadhead looked 
under the right front seat where he observed the suspicious 
movement. Deputed Broadhead limited his search to the right 
front area and found a brown leather case under the right front 
seat. On opening the leather case, Deputy Broadhead found 
various controlled substances as well as drug paraphernalia. 
6. The defendant denied knowledge or ownership of the leather 
case at which time Deputy Broadhead then Mirandized the defendant 
and arrested him for possession of controlled substances and drug 
paraphernalia. 
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CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. The reasonableness of the search and seizure incident to the 
traffic stop is governed by a two prong test: (1) Was Deputy 
Broadhead's action justified at its inception? and (2) Was the 
resulting detention reasonably related in scope to the 
circumstances justifying the interference in the first place? 
Terry v- Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 19-20, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 1879, 20 L.Ed.2d 
889 (1968). 
2. Deputy Broadhead was constitutionally justified in stopping 
the defendant's vehicle for a traffic violation committed in his 
presence. State v. Lopez, 873 P.2d 1127, 1132 (Utah 1994). (Also 
stipulated by both sides). 
3. Deputy Broadhead's investigative questioning of the defendant 
did not exceed the limited scope of the initial traffic stop but 
served to confirm or dispel his concern about the aef^T^aTrt/s 
actions during the course of the traffic stop. During the brief 
investigative questioning, it was necessary to detain the 
defendant. State v, Grovier, 808 P.2d 133,136 (Utah Ct. App. 
1991) (quoting United States v. Shame. 470 U.S. 675, 686, 105, 
S.Ct. 1568, 1575, 84 L.Ed.2d 605 (1985)). 
4. Despite the purposes of a traffic stop, Deputy Broadhead's 
inquiries though unrelated to the traffic violation were 
objectively supported by probable cause as well as reasonable 
suspicion. Lopez at 1135. Specifically, (1) the defendant 
failed to immediately pull over when signaled, (2) the defendant 
made several rapid movements to the right before stopping, and 
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after stopping as the officer approached his vehicle, (3) the 
defendant's denial of any "stuffing" movements and apparent 
extreme nervousness, and (4) Deputy Broadhead's concern for his 
safety as well as the possibility that the defendant was 
concealing a weapon or contraband. 
5. The State has met its burden by showing the defendant 
voluntarily and specifically consented to Deputy Broadhead's 
search of the front right area of his vehicle when (1) in 
response to the inquiry about weapons and contraband he said 
"You're free to look if you want." and (2) in response to a 
request to search he said "Go right ahead." Grovier § 136. The 
law does not require a suspect to be informed of his or her right 
to refuse or that the consent be written. State v. Contrel, 886 
P.2d 107, 111 (Utah Ct.App. 1994), State V. Delanev. 869 P.2d 4, 
8 (Utah Ct. App. 1994). 
6. The legality of the traffic stop coupled with the absence of 
any illegal conduct by the deputy, and the defendant's voluntary 
consent supports denial of the defendant's Motion to Suppress. 
State v. Godina-Luna. 826 P.2d 652, 655 (Utah App. 1992). 
Moreover, in State v. Bradford. 839 P.2d 866, 869 (Utah Ct. App. 
1992) the Utah Court of Appeals said: " If, while conducting a 
legitimate Terry search of the interior of the automobile, the 
officer should, as here, discover contraband other than weapons, 
he clearly cannot be required to ignore the contraband, and the 
Fourth Amendment does not require its suppression in such 
circumstances. " 
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DECISION 
Based on the above Findings of Facts and Conclusions of Lav, 
this court finds that Deputy Broadhead's search of the 
defendant's vehicle was reasonable and limited, and conducted 
with the defendant's specific voluntary consent. The defendant's 
Motion to Suppress is hereby denied. 




I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of 
the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law to the 
following, this /& day of March, 1996. 
Robin K. Youngbeirg, Esq. 
Attorney for Defendant 
Salt Lake Legal Defender Association 
424 East 500 South, Suite 300 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
E. Neal Gunnarson, Esq. 
District Attorney for Salt Lake County 
Michael J. Christensen, Esq. 
Deputy District Attorney 
231 East 400 South, Suite 300 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
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